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Abstract—We consider the problem of designing (or augment-
ing) an electric power system at a minimum cost such that
it satisfies the N-k-ε survivability criterion. This survivability
criterion is a generalization of the well-known N-k criterion, and
it requires that at least (1− ε j) fraction of the total demand
to be met after failures of up to j components, for j = 1, · · · ,k.
The network design problem adds another level of complexity
to the notoriously hard contingency analysis problem, since
the contingency analysis is only one of the requirements for
the design optimization problem. We present a mixed-integer
programming formulation of this problem that takes into account
both transmission and generation expansion. We propose an al-
gorithm that can avoid combinatorial explosion in the number of
contingencies, by seeking vulnerabilities in intermediary solutions
and constraining the design space accordingly. Our approach
is built on our ability to identify such system vulnerabilities
quickly. Our empirical studies on modified instances from the
IEEE 30-bus and IEEE 57-bus systems show the effectiveness
of our methods. We were able to solve the transmission and
generation expansion problems for k = 4 under 2 minutes, while
other approaches failed to provide a solution at the end of 2
hours.
Index Terms—Long-term grid planning, contingency require-
ments, decomposition, separation oracle, implicit optimization.
I. INTRODUCTION
CONTINGENCY analysis of power systems is a problemof increasing importance due to ever increasing demand
for electricity. This increase in electricity demand outpaces the
increase in system capacity growth, which leaves less room
for redundancy in the system. As a consequence, equipment
failures are now more likely to lead to blackouts. At the
same time, society’s increased reliance on electricity breeds
far and wide ramifications for a blackout. While minimizing
the likelihood of any blackout is a laudable goal, this will
inevitably come at an economic cost. A partial remedy for
increasing costs is to take into account both the likelihood
of an event and severity of its consequences in the planning
phase. This concept is adopted in Transmission Planning
Standard (TPL-001-1, [1]), defined by the North American
Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC). According to this
standard, if only a single element is lost (N−1 contingency),
the system must be stable, without any loss-of-load. In the case
of k simultaneous failures (N−k contingency), the system still
has to restore stability, but a limited loss-of-load is allowed.
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While contingency analysis, as a concept, is simple, al-
gorithmically it is far from trivial. Despite its difficulty, the
critical importance of the problem has drawn a lot of interest,
and significant progress has been made over the last decade. In
particular, optimization methods have been proposed to replace
enumerative approaches that rely on verifying feasibility on
each state of a given list of contingencies. For example,
optimization methods are used to find small groups of lines
whose failure can cause a severe blackout or a large loss-
of-load [2], [3], [4], [5], [6]. N-k contingencies were also
studied in optimal power flow models [7], [8], [9] and unit
commitment problems [10] using a single bus model. The
methods used in [6], [9], [10] are all based on a bilevel
programming approach, which is the main method used for
network inhibition/interdiction problems. Probability analysis
[11], limitations on generation and line capacity [12], swarm
optimization [13], and methods based on topological charac-
teristics of power grids [14] have been used for vulnerability
analysis. Other approaches for contingency analysis are re-
viewed in [15], [16].
The great strides in contingency analysis over the last
decade have established the basis for higher objectives. In this
paper, we consider the transmission and generation expansion
planning (TGEP) problem with contingency constraints. Our
goal is to design (or augment) a power system at a minimum
cost to satisfy contingency constraints. We formalize the con-
tingency requirements with the N–k–ε criterion, where ε is a
parameter vector that specifies allowable loss-of-load, for each
contingency size, as a fraction of total system demand. More
specifically, this criterion requires that for any contingency of
size j = 0,1, · · · ,k, at least (1−ε j) fraction of the total demand
must be satisfied. Following NERC’s TPL-001-1 standards, for
the no-contingency state and contingencies of size one ( j = 1),
no loss-of-load is allowed (i.e. ε0 = ε1 = 0); for multiple failure
contingencies ( j ≥ 2), a small fraction of total load demand
can be shed (i.e. 0 < ε2 ≤ ·· · ≤ εk < 1).
To understand the complexity of the TGEP, one should ob-
serve that contingency analysis, a difficult combinatorial opti-
mization problem by itself, is only one of the prerequisite steps
in solving TGEP; we must also address network design issues.
Our approach is built on our ability to solve the contingency
analysis problem efficiently so that it can be embedded in a
broader framework. We begin by formulating a mixed-integer
linear program (MILP) to model TGEP that explicitly includes
multiple states representing each of the possible contingency
states and, for each of these contingency states, contains the
corresponding generation and flow variables to ensure that
at least (1− ε j) fraction of the demand can be met. Such
an enumerative approach, however, becomes computationally
intractable even for moderate values of system size N and
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maximum contingency-size budget k, since the number of
states grows with
(N
k
)
. Furthermore, it should be noted that
contingency analysis for TGEP requires looking at higher
values of k, compared with contingency analysis for shorter
term problems. The reason is that in long term problems,
planned outages, such as system components going under
maintenance, contribute to k, whereas in shorter-term problems
they do not. For instance, for day-ahead planning, we will
know the unavailable system components in advance; remove
them from the system; and then we will do contingency analy-
sis for unexpected failures in the remaining system. However,
for long term problems such as TGEP, we want to design a
system such that a feasible direct current optimal power flow
(DCOPF) exists for any combination of planned and unplanned
outages. This forces us to look at higher values of k, which
makes enumerative approaches prohibitively expensive, even
when state of the art high performance computing platforms
are available.
To overcome this challenge, we propose two cutting plane
algorithms, one based on a direct application of Benders
decomposition method to check the load satisfaction of each
contingency state explicitly and another based on an online
contingency state generation (OCS) algorithm, which solves
bilevel separation problems to determine the worst-case loss-
of-load for each contingency size j = 0,1, · · · ,k. The OCS
algorithm implicitly identifies worst-case contingencies with-
out explicitly evaluating all contingency states, and generates
additional constraints, corresponding to Benders feasibility
constraints, to exclude solutions that are infeasible under the
identified worst-case contingencies. This approach avoids the
prohibitive cost of generating a constraint for every combina-
tion of failures, by only identifying relevant combinations as
needed. As the computational experiments show, this reduction
to only relevant contingencies makes a tremendous impact on
the scalability of the algorithm.
We applied these approaches to the IEEE 30-bus and IEEE
57-bus systems. Computational results show the scalability of
the OCS algorithm. We were able to solve the TGEP problem
for up to k = 4 in under 2 minutes, while explicit enumeration
approaches, e.g. extensive form and Benders decomposition,
failed to provide any solutions at the end of 2 hours. We
observed the key to our success was our ability to avoid
looking at all individual vulnerabilities, and only a small
number of iterations (vulnerability searches) are enough to
find a provably-optimal solution.
Transmission and generation expansion problems have been
studied for a long time. A survey of earlier work in this
area can be found in [17]. Recently, especially after the
2003 Northeast American blackout, security, stability and
reliability issues have been becoming another major concerns
in modern power systems. Our earlier results were presented
in [18], [19]. [20] and [21] addressed the defense protection
of power system, and they analyzed the interaction between
a power system defender and a terrorist who seeks to disrupt
system operations. [22], [23], and [24] studied the contingency
criteria by stochastic programming and integer programming
approaches. [25] and [21] proposed a multilevel mixed integer
programming models for transmission expansion. Most of
the work in this area however, is restricted to the N − 1
contingency criteria, which cannot reflect current situation for
contingencies with more than one failure. Additionally, the
proposed models cannot be directly extended for this new
situation, and they only consider the transmission expansion,
and contingencies are restricted to transmission elements.
The generation expansion problem has recently been studied
in [26]. Transmission expansion and generation expansion
planning problems have also been studied in a unified model
[27]. Integration of renewable energy resources was taken into
account generation and transmission expansion planning [28],
[27], [26]. However, none of these studies consider the contin-
gency criteria in case of failures of both generating unit and
transmission elements.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section
II, the TGEP problem considering the full set of contingency
states is formulated as a mixed integer nonlinear program
(MINLP); Section III presents two methods to solve this large-
scale MINLP; in Section IV, results of numerical experiments
performed on two IEEE test systems are presented; Section V
concludes the paper.
II. MODELS
A. Nomenclature
Sets and indices
V Set of buses (indexed by i, j).
S j Set of all contingency states with exactly j failures
(indexed by s).
S Set of all contingency states with k or less failures,
S = S1∪S2 · · · ∪Sk.
|s| Number of failed element(s) in contingency s.
G Set of generating units (indexed by g).
Gi Set of generating units at bus i.
E Set of transmission elements (indexed by e).
E.i Set of transmission elements oriented into bus i.
Ei. Set of transmission elements oriented out of bus i.
ie, je Tail/head (bus no.) of transmission element e = (ie, je).
Parameters
Ce Investment cost of transmission element e.
Cg Investment cost of generating unit g.
Cpg Marginal production cost of generating unit g.
Pg Maximum capacity of generating unit g.
Be Electrical susceptance of transmission element e.
Fe Capacity of transmission element e.
Di Electricity load demand at bus i.
D Total electricity load demand across all bus i ∈V ,
D = ∑i∈V Di.
Me Big M value for transmission element e.
σ Weighting factor to make investment cost and
operating cost comparable.
N Total number of transmission elements and
generating units, N = |G|+ |E|.
k Maximum contingency size under consideration.
In any contingency state the number of failures, i.e. the
number of system elements in a contingency, is
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between 0 and k.
ε j Fraction of load demand that can be shed given size j
contingencies, for all j = 0,1, · · · ,k.
˜dsg Binary parameter that is 1 if generating unit g is
part of the contingency state s and 0 otherwise.
˜dse Binary parameter that is 1 if transmission element e
is part of the contingency state s and 0 otherwise.
˜ds Vector that concatenates ˜dsg and ˜dse variables.
Decision variables
xg Binary variable that is 1 if generating unit g is added
and 0 otherwise.
xe Binary variable that is 1 if transmission element e is
added and 0 otherwise.
x Vector that concatenates xg and xe variables.
fe Power flow on transmission element e.
pg Power output of generating unit g.
qi Loss-of-load at bus i.
θi Phase angle of bus i.
dg Binary variable that is 1 if generating unit g is
selected to be in the contingency and 0 otherwise.
de Binary variable that is 1 if transmission element e is
selected to be in the contingency and 0 otherwise.
f se Power flow for transmission element e for
contingency state s.
psg Power output of generating unit g for contingency
state s.
qsi Loss of load at bus i for contingency state s.
θ si Phase angle of bus i for contingency state s.
For a contingency state s ∈ S, ˜dsg = 1 and ˜dse = 1 denote that
generating unit g and transmission element e fail in this state,
respectively. Conversely, ˜dsg = 0 and ˜dse = 0 denote that both
these two elements are available. Thus, for s = 0 denoting the
no-contingency state, we have ˜d0g = 0 and ˜d0e = 0 for all g∈G
and e ∈ E .
B. Transmission and Generation Expansion Model
In this section, we extend the standard TGEP problem to
include contingency constraints. For brevity of presentation,
we treat all power system elements, including existing ones, as
candidates for addition to the system. For an existing element,
the investment cost (Ce,Cg) is set to 0 and the corresponding
investment decisions (xe,xg) fixed at 1.
Once the network design decisions are made, each element
selected for addition becomes available in all contingency
states s ∈ S j and j = 0,1, · · · ,k, unless it is part of a given
contingency. Consistent with the NERC reliability standards,
in the no-contingency state (N-0) and the single contingency
state (N-1), no loss-of-load is allowed, thus ε0 = ε1 = 0. For
larger contingency states, e.g. j = 2, · · · ,k, the total loss-of-
load is limited by the threshold ε j. We assume that ε j ≤ ε j+1
for all j = 0,1, · · · ,k− 1. The MINLP model for TGEP is
formulated as follows,
min
x˜,f,p,q,θ ∑
e∈E
Cexe + ∑
g∈G
Cgxg +σ ∑
g∈G
Cpg p0g (1a)
s.t. ∑
g∈Gi
psg + ∑
e∈E.i
f se − ∑
e∈Ei.
f se + qsi = Di, ∀i ∈V, (1b)
s ∈ S
Be
(
θ sie −θ
s
je
)
xe(1− ˜dse)− f se = 0, ∀e ∈ E, (1c)
s ∈ S
−Fexe(1− ˜dse)≤ f se ≤ Fexe(1− ˜dse), ∀e ∈ E, (1d)
s ∈ S
0≤ psg ≤ Pgxg(1− ˜dsg), ∀g ∈G,s ∈ S (1e)
∑
i∈V
qsi ≤ ε|s|D, ∀s ∈ S (1f)
0≤ qsi ≤ Di, ∀i ∈V,∀s ∈ S (1g)
xg ∈ {0,1}, ∀g ∈G (1h)
xe ∈ {0,1}, ∀e ∈ E (1i)
In all subsequent formulations, unless otherwise specified, the
indices i,g,e,s and k are elements of their corresponding sets,
i.e., i ∈V,g ∈ G,e ∈ E , and s ∈ S.
The objective (1a) is to minimize the total transmission and
generation investment cost plus the weighted operating cost
in the no-contingency state (s = 0). Note that our formula-
tion does not take into account the operational costs during
a contingency state. There are two reasons for this. First,
contingencies have low likelihood and thus the operational
costs during such events are negligible. The real financial
burden of a contingency shows itself when the contingency
leads to a blackout, which brings us to the second reason:
the primary goal during a contingency is to keep the system
intact as opposed to minimizing operational costs, since the
cost of system failure is likely to be significantly higher than
any operational cost. Constraints (1b) are conservation of
flow requirements for each bus and contingency pair. For any
transmission element that is operational, Kirchhoff’s voltage
law must be enforced by (1c). Power flow on transmission
element e is governed by thermal capacity constraints (1d). For
each contingency state, the power output of a generating unit
must satisfy the upper bound given by (1e). Constraints (1f)
dictate that the total loss-of-load in the system cannot exceed
ε|s| fraction of the total system load, i.e., at least (1− ε|s|)D
of demand must be satisfied. Constraints (1g) restrict the loss-
of-load at each bus to be at most the total demand at the bus.
Observe that constraints (1b)-(1g) are specific to a particular
contingency state; that is, for a given contingency state s,
the transmission and generation element(s) in the contingency
have zero capacity. In the no-contingency state s = 0, all in-
vested transmission elements and generating units are available
for the DCOPF problem.
III. SOLUTION APPROACHES
Replacing constraints (1c) by
Be
(
θ sie −θ
s
je
)
− f se +Me(1− xe+ ˜dse)≥ 0, ∀e,s, (2)
Be
(
θ sie −θ
s
je
)
− f se −Me(1− xe+ ˜dse)≤ 0, ∀e,s. (3)
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where Me is a sufficiently large constant, transforms formu-
lation (1) to a mixed integer linear program (MILP), which
we refer to as the extensive form (EF). EF will typically
have an extremely large number of variables and constraints
because it grows with the number of contingency states, which
increases exponentially with N and k. For large power systems
and/or a contingency k greater than one, EF rapidly becomes
computationally intractable for increasing system size, N, and
increasing contingency size, k. In the following sections, we
modify this formulation and present cutting plane algorithms
for solving the reformulated problem.
A. Benders Decomposition
We begin by presenting an alternative formulation with only
|G|+ |E| binary variables but possibly an extremely large
number of constraints. We use linear programming duality to
generate valid inequalities for the projection of the natural
formulation onto the space of the x˜ variables. In essence, we
use a variant of Benders Decomposition, in which we only
generate valid inequalities corresponding to “feasibility” cuts.
For a given contingency state, s∈ S, capacity expansion vec-
tor x˜ and contingency state vector ˜ds, we solve the following
linear program, denoted as the primal subproblem PSP(x˜, ˜ds),
to determine a DCOPF that minimizes total system loss-of-
load.
min
f,p,q,θ ∑i∈V q
s
i (4a)
s.t. (αsi ) ∑
g∈Gi
psg + ∑
e∈E.i
f se − ∑
e∈Ei.
f se + qsi = Di, ∀i (4b)
( ˆβ se ) −Be
(
θ sie −θ
s
je
)
+ f se ≤Me(1− x˜e + ˜dse), ∀e (4c)
( ˇβ se ) Be
(
θ sie −θ
s
je
)
− f se ≤Me(1− x˜e+ ˜dse), ∀e (4d)
(δ se ) f se ≤ Fex˜e(1− ˜dse), ∀e (4e)
(ηse) − f se ≤ Fex˜e(1− ˜dse), ∀e (4f)
(ζ sg) 0≤ psg ≤ Pgx˜g(1− ˜dsg), ∀g (4g)
(λ si ) 0≤ qsi ≤ Di, ∀i (4h)
In this formulation, the objective, (4a), is to minimize total
loss-of-load by adjusting the flow, phase angles and power
generation, given the prescribed capacity expansion decision x˜
and contingency vector ˜ds, corresponding to scenario s. Letting
z(x˜, ˜ds) be the optimal objective value of (4), if z(x˜, ˜ds)> ε|s|D,
there does not exist a feasible DC power flow satisfying at
least (1−ε|s|) of total demand. Alternatively, if z(x˜, ˜ds)≤ ε|s|D,
there exists a power flow that can satisfy at least (1− ε|s|) of
total demand.
Variables in parentheses on the left-hand-side of the con-
straints in (4) denote the corresponding dual variables. In turn,
we can formulate the dual of this problem, DSP(x˜, ˜ds) as
follows,
max
α , ˆβ , ˇβ ,δ ,η,ζ ,λ ∑i∈V Di(α
s
i +λ si )+ ∑
e∈E
Me(1− xe + ˜dse)( ˆβ se + ˇβ se )
+ ∑
e∈E
Fexe(1− ˜dse)(δ se +ηse)+ ∑
g∈G
Pgxg(1− ˜dsg)ζ sg ,
subject to constraints corresponding to primal variables
f,p,q,θ . Since PSP(x˜, ˜ds) has a finite optimal solution value
(in the worst case, all load will be shed), DSP(x˜, ˜ds) also
has a finite optimal solution value and by strong duality,
the optimal solutions coincide. Since DSP(x˜, ˜ds) has a finite
optimal solution value it also has an optimal extreme point.
Thus we can reformulate PSP(x˜, ˜ds) as follows,
max
ℓ∈Ls ∑i∈V Di(α
ℓ
i +λ ℓi )+ ∑
e∈E
Me(1− x˜e+ ˜dse)( ˆβ ℓe + ˇβ ℓe )
+ ∑
e∈E
Fex˜e(1− ˜dse)(δ ℓe +ηℓe)+ ∑
g∈G
Pgx˜g(1− ˜dsg)ζ ℓg , (5)
where Ls is the set of extreme points corresponding to the
polyhedron characterized by dual constraints based on (4) for
primal variables f,p,q,θ .
The constraint z(x˜, ˜ds) ≤ ε|s|D should be satisfied for all
s ∈ S. Thus contingency feasibility conditions can be defined
as follows,
∑
i∈V
Di(αsℓi +λ ℓi )+ ∑
e∈E
Me(1− xe + ˜dse)( ˆβ ℓe + ˇβ sℓe )
+ ∑
e∈E
Fexe(1− ˜dse)(δ ℓe +ηℓe)+ ∑
g∈G
Pgxg(1− ˜dsg)ζ ℓg (6)
≤ ε|s|D, ∀ℓ ∈ Ls,s ∈ S
Since the objective is to minimize total investment cost and
operating cost in the no-contingency state (s = 0), we enforce
all constraints for state 0 explicitly. For all other contingency
states s ∈ S \ {0}, constraint set (6) ensures that at least ε|s|
fraction of the total demand is satisfied. The reformulation of
(1) is given as:
min
x,f,p,q,θ ∑
e∈E
Cexe + ∑
g∈G
Cgxg +σ ∑
g∈G
Cpg p0g (7a)
s.t. ∑
i∈V
Di(αℓi +λ ℓi )+ ∑
e∈E
Me(1− xe+ ˜dse)( ˆβ ℓe + ˇβ ℓe )
+ ∑
e∈E
Fexe(1− ˜dse)(δ ℓe +ηℓe)+ ∑
g∈G
Pgxg(1− ˜dsg)ζ ℓg
≤ ε|s|D, ∀ℓ ∈ Ls,s ∈ S \ {0} (7b)
∑
g∈Gi
p0g + ∑
e∈E.i
f 0e − ∑
e∈Ei.
f 0e = Di, ∀i ∈V (7c)
Be
(
θ 0ie −θ
0
je
)
− f 0e +Me(1− xe)≥ 0, ∀e ∈ E (7d)
Be
(
θ 0ie −θ
0
je
)
− f 0e −Me(1− xe)≤ 0, ∀e ∈ E (7e)
−Fe ≤ f 0e ≤ Fe, ∀e ∈ E (7f)
0≤ p0g ≤ Pgxg, ∀g ∈ G (7g)
xg ∈ {0,1}, ∀g ∈ G (7h)
xe ∈ {0,1}, ∀e ∈ E (7i)
The number of constraints in formulation (1) grows expo-
nentially with the problem size, so we solve it via Benders
Decomposition (BD). At a typical iteration of BD, we consider
the restricted master problem (RMP) (7), which has the same
objective as (1) but involves only a small subset of the
constraints in (7b). We briefly outline BD below. For a detailed
treatment of BD please refer to [29].
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Let t be the iteration number and let the initial RMP
be problem (7) without any (7b) constraints. Let x˜t be a
concatenation of the expansion variables in the t th iteration.
Algorithm 1 Benders Decomposition (BD)
1: t← 0
2: solve RMP
3: if RMP is infeasible
4: EXIT, TGEP is infeasible
5: else
6: Let x˜t be the optimal solution to RMP
7: for s∈ S, solve DSP(x˜t , ˜ds), let zt be the objective value
8: if zt > ε|s|D
9: Add feasibility cut (6) to RMP
10: end if
11: end for
12: if no feasibility cut(s) added in Step 9
13: x˜t is optimal, EXIT
14: else
15: t← t + 1, go to Step 2
16: end if
17: end if
By using a Benders reformulation, we are able to decom-
pose the extremely large formulation (1) into a master problem
and multiple subproblems (one for each contingency state).
In theory, this enables us to solve larger instances, which
would not be possible by a direct solution of EF. However,
the extremely large number of contingency states makes direct
application of Benders ineffective for large power systems
and/or a non-trivial contingency budget (i.e., k > 1). In the
next section, we develop a custom cutting plane algorithm
that evaluates all possible contingency states implicitly using
a bilevel separation oracle.
B. Online Contingency Scenario Generation
Sizes of most power systems in operation (typically thou-
sands of generating units and transmission elements) may
preclude direct solution of (1). Even using a decomposi-
tion algorithm (e.g. BD) may not be feasible because each
contingency state must be considered explicitly. Our goal is
to instead use a separation oracle that implicitly evaluates
all contingency states and either identifies a violated one (a
contingency with j failures (for all j = 1, · · · ,k) that cannot
be survived by the current power system design) or provides
a certificate that no such contingency state exists. If such
a contingency exists, we use this contingency to generate a
violated Benders feasibility cut, as described in the previous
section, for the RMP. If no such contingency exists, then the
current capacity expansion x˜ is optimal and we terminate the
algorithm.
1) Power System Inhibition Problem (PSIP): Given a ca-
pacity expansion decision x˜, the Power System Inhibition
Problem (PSIP) can be used to determine the worst-case
loss-of-load under any contingency with j failures, for all
j = 1, · · · ,k. In this bilevel program, the upper level decisions
d correspond to binary contingency selection decisions and the
lower level decisions (f,p,q,θ ) correspond to recourse power
flow, generation scheduling, and load shedding decisions rel-
ative to the given contingency, prescribed by d.
Note that in the prior model ˜ds was an input parameter,
whereas in this formulation, we are now selecting the elements
of the contingency, with d becoming a vector of decision vari-
ables. For clarity of exposition, the superscript s corresponding
to variables f,p,q and θ has been removed, as the contingency
state is not pre-specified, but rather part of the decision making
process within the PSIP(x˜, j). PSIP(x˜, j) is given as follows:
max
d
min
f,p,q,θ ∑i∈V qi (8a)
s.t. ∑
e∈E
de + ∑
g∈G
dg = j, (8b)
(αi) ∑
g∈Gi
pg + ∑
e∈E.i
fe− ∑
e∈Ei.
fe + qi = Di, ∀i (8c)
( ˆβe) −Be(θie −θ je
)
+ fe ≤Me(1− x˜e+ de), ∀e (8d)
( ˇβe) Be(θie −θ je
)
− fe ≤Me(1− x˜e+ de), ∀e (8e)
(δe) fe ≤ Fex˜e(1− de), ∀e (8f)
(ηe) − fe ≤ Fex˜e(1− de), ∀e (8g)
(ζg) 0≤ pg ≤ Pgx˜g(1− dg), ∀g (8h)
(λi) 0≤ qi ≤ Di, ∀i (8i)
The objective (8a) is to maximize the minimum loss-of-load.
For a given contingency state defined by d, the objective of the
power system operator (the inner minimization problem) is to
determine the DCOPF such that the loss-of-load is minimized.
Constraint (8b) is a budget constraint limiting the number
of power system elements that can be in the contingency.
Constraints (8c) are standard flow conservation constraints.
Constraints (8d) and (8e) together enforce Kirchhoff’s voltage
law, for active transmission elements. Constraints (8f) and
(8g) are constraints associated with the capacity of each
transmission element. Constraints (8h) limit the maximum
capacity of each generating unit. If a generating unit g is
NOT part of the contingency (i.e., dg = 0), then the maximum
capacity of the generating unit is enforced, if the unit was
added (xg = 1). Otherwise, the power output of the generating
unit must be zero.
The upper-level decisions of this bilevel program are to se-
lect a contingency, using the binary variables d, that maximizes
the subsequent loss-of-load in the lower-level problem.
2) A MILP Reformulation of PSIP: Bilevel programs like
(8) cannot be solved directly. One approach is to reformulate
the bilevel program by dualizing the inner minimization prob-
lem. For fixed values of d, the inner minimization problem is
a linear program that is always feasible. By strong duality, and
combining the upper level of (8) we can reformulate the bilevel
program as a single level bilinear program, where the objective
function of the dualized problem contain terms associated
with the product of the upper-level contingency selection
variables d and the lower-level dual variables ( ˆβ , ˇβ ,δ ,η ,ζ )
associated with flow balance, transmission flow, transmission
capacity, and generation capacity constraints. However, with
additional variables and constraints, these bilinear terms can
be linearized.
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Each bilinear term can be linearized using the following
strategy. Let u≤ 0 and v≤ 0 be continuous variables and b ∈
{0,1}. Then the bilinear term, bu, can be linearized as follows.
Letting v = bu, we introduce the following three constraints to
linearize the bilinear term bu.
v≥ u−U(1− b) (9a)
v≥−Ub (9b)
v≤ u+U(1− b) (9c)
Here, parameter U represents a valid upper bound for con-
tinuous variable u and satisfies U ≥ |u|. Assessing these three
constraints for both binary values of b show that they indeed
provide a valid linearization. If b = 0, then constraints (9b)
and v ≤ 0 together imply that v = 0. With v = 0, constraints
(9a) and (9c) together imply that −U ≤ u≤U , which are never
binding. If b= 1, then constraints (9a) and (9c) together imply
u= v and constraints (9b) and v≤ 0 implies−U ≤ v≤ 0, which
is valid.
We follow a similar strategy to linearize all five bilinear
terms ( ˆβ de, ˇβ de,δde,ηde,ζdg). Define continuous variables
(r1,r2,r3,r4,r5) and let r1e = ˆβede, r2e = ˇβede, r3e = δede, r4e =
ηde, and r5g = ζgdg. Following the same linearization strategy
introduced in (9), we now state the full mixed integer linear
PSIP formulation for completeness, which we call the Mixed-
Integer Power System Inhibition Problem, M-PSIP(x˜, j):
max
d,α , ˆβ , ˇβ ,δ ,η,ζ ,r ∑i∈V Di(αi +λi)+ ∑e∈E Me(1− x˜e)(
ˆβe + ˇβe)
+ ∑
e∈E
(
Me(r1e + r
2
e)+Fex˜e(δe +ηe)−Fex˜e(r3e + r4e)
)
+ ∑
g∈G
(
Pgx˜gζg−Pgx˜gr5g
)
(10a)
s.t. ∑
e∈E
de + ∑
g∈G
dg = j, (10b)
α je −αie + ˆβe− ˇβe+ δe−ηe = 0, ∀e (10c)
αig + ζg ≤ 0, ∀g (10d)
αi +λi ≤ 1, ∀i (10e)
∑
e∈Eie=i,.
Be( ˇβe− ˆβe)+ ∑
e∈E., je=i
Be( ˆβe− ˇβe) = 0, ∀i (10f)
ˆβe ≤ 0, ˇβe ≤ 0, δe ≤ 0, ηe ≤ 0, ∀e (10g)
r1e ≤ 0, r2e ≤ 0, r3e ≤ 0, r4e ≤ 0, ∀e (10h)
ζg ≤ 0, r5e ≤ 0, ∀g (10i)
λi ≤ 0, ∀i (10j)
Next, we outline an algorithm for optimally solving problem
(1) that combines a Benders decomposition with the aid of an
oracle given by (10), which acts as a separation problem. A
given capacity expansion x˜ is optimal if the oracle cannot find
a contingency of size j, for any j = 1, · · · ,k, that results in a
loss-of-load above the allowable threshold ε jD.
For each contingency budget j, we can check for j-element
contingencies by solving M-PSIP using a failure budget of
j (i.e. the right-hand side of inequality (10b) is set to j).
Whenever the oracle determines that the capacity expansion
decision x˜ is not N-k-ε compliant, it returns a contingency
d that results in a loss-of-load, above the allowable threshold
ε jD for j-element failures.
Let r be the iteration number and let the initial RMP
be problem (7) without any (7b) constraints. Let x˜r be a
concatenation of the expansion variables (xre,xrg).
Algorithm 2 Online Contingency Screening (OCS)
1: t← 0
2: Solve RMP for iteration t
3: if RMP is infeasible
4: EXIT, TGEP is infeasible
5: else
6: Let x˜t be the optimal solution to RMP
7: for j = 1, · · · ,k
8: Solve M-PSIP(x˜t , j), let ztj be the objective value
9: and dtj be the contingency selection decision
10: if ztj > ε jD then
11: Solve DSP(x˜t ,dtj), add feasibility cut (6) to RMP
12: t← t + 1, go to step 2
13: end if
14: end for
15: end if
16: x˜t is optimal, EXIT
At each iteration, either a contingency that results in loss-
of-load above the allowable threshold is identified and a
corresponding feasibility cut is generated and added to RMP,
or no contingencies are found, which means that the current
solution is optimal and the algorithm can terminate.
IV. NUMERICAL EXPERIMENTS
We implemented the proposed models and algorithms in
C++ and CPLEX 12.1 via ILOG Concert Technology 2.9. All
experiments were run on a machine with four quad-core 2.93G
Xeon with 96G of memory. For the following computational
experiments, a single CPU and up to 8GB of RAM were
allocated. The optimality gap was set to be 0.1% for CPLEX.
We have tested our models and algorithms on the IEEE 30-
bus and IEEE 57-bus systems [30]. For each power system,
we consider five different contingency budgets k = 0,1,2,3,
and 4. Altogether, we consider 10 instances.
Table I compares the run times for the three different
approaches. For each of the 10 instances, m provides the
number of distinct contingencies. Initially for each test sys-
tem, we replicate a subset of existing generating units and
transmission lines to create a set of candidate elements. With
these candidate elements as a starting point, we iteratively
solve the PSIP problem for k and ε values presented in
Table I using OCS. In all 10 instances, the values of εi are
invariant. That is, for instance, ε2 = 0.05 when k was chosen
to be 2,3, or 4. For these, we identify vulnerabilities in the
power system and introduce additional candidate generation
and transmission elements. We follow this method to create
the augmented the IEEE 30-bus and IEEE 57-bus test systems
for the computational experiments presented subsequently.
We want to note that our contributions in this paper are in
algorithmic fundamentals, and thus are not very sensitive to
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the particular problem instances. Hence, the particular list of
candidates lines for a problem instance will only have a minor
effect on the performances of our algorithms.
TABLE I
RUN TIMES FOR DIFFERENT SOLUTION APPROACHES
Solution time (secs)
Test Systems m k ε EF BD OCS
IEEE 30-bus 0 0 0 0 0 0
152 1 0 76 2 4
> 11K 2 0.05 x 87 16
> 500K 3 0.10 x 3,126 128
> 21M 4 0.20 x x 141
IEEE 57-bus 0 0 0 0 0 0
110 1 0 27 164 120
> 5K 2 0.05 x 870 36
> 200K 3 0.10 x x 51
> 5M 4 0.20 x x 65
Table I provides the run time (in CPU seconds) for each
instance under the three different approaches. In this table “x”
means the algorithm failed to complete at the end of 2 hours.
Note that the first approach, the extensive form (EF), can only
solve the smallest of instances. This is because of the sheer
size of the problem, in which, for each contingency, a full
DCOPF problem must be embedded in the formulation. As
the number of contingencies grows, this formulation quickly
becomes intractable. Note that we are working with small data
sets here and target systems will be in the order of thousands
of elements, which will make EF intractable even sooner.
The second approach, BD, bypasses this problem via a
Benders decomposition, with corresponding delayed cut gener-
ation. However, this still suffers from the combinatorial growth
in the number of contingency states – for each contingency,
a subproblem (DSP) must be solved to check for violated
feasibility cuts to add to the RMP. We see that larger problem
instances can be solved, relative to EF, but the BD approach
nonetheless cannot solve the largest problem instances.
With the OCS approach, we see that all instances of the
problem can be solved, in all cases in under three minutes
and frequently in only a few seconds. This is a result of the
combination of the strength of the Benders cuts, enabling the
problem to be solved in a very limited number of iterations,
and also the fact that we are able to implicitly evaluate the
contingencies in order to identify a violated contingency and
then quickly find its corresponding feasibility cut by solving
a single linear program (DSP).
Table II provides us with further evidence for the scalability
of OCS. For each instance, we see the total number of possible
contingency states m and then the number of contingency
states for which corresponding feasibility cuts were actually
generated, denoted by ‘cont.’ in the table. Clearly, it is a
very tiny fraction of the possible number of contingencies,
which is critical to the tractability of the approach. The
remaining columns of this table breakdown the total run time
by time spent on the three components of the algorithm – the
RMP, which identifies a candidate network design; the mixed-
integer linear power system inhibition problem (M-PSIP),
which identifies a contingency that cannot be overcome by
the current network design; and the dual subproblems (DSP),
which generates the feasibility cuts.
TABLE II
OCS RUNTIME BREAKDOWN
Test Systems m k ε RMP M-PSIP DSP cont.
IEEE 30-bus 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
152 1 0 1 3 0 2
> 11K 2 0.05 1 15 0 5
> 500K 3 0.10 1 127 0 8
> 21M 4 0.20 1 140 0 10
IEEE 57-bus 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
110 1 0 83 37 0 3
> 5K 2 0.05 15 21 0 4
> 200K 3 0.10 14 37 0 7
> 5M 4 0.20 14 51 0 8
V. CONCLUSION
We studied the transmission and generation expansion prob-
lem with contingency constraints. More specifically, we inves-
tigated the problem of improving an electric power system at
a minimum cost by adding generators and transmission lines,
such that it satisfies the N-k-ε survivability criterion. This
survivability criterion is a generalization of the well-known N-
k criterion, and it requires that at least (1−ε j) fraction of the
total demand is met even after failures of any j system com-
ponents, for all j = 1, · · · ,k. This design problem adds another
level of complexity to the contingency analysis problem, since
the contingency analysis is only one of the constraints in the
design optimization problem. We proposed two algorithms:
one is based on the Benders decomposition approach, and
the other is based on online contingency state generation.
The latter approach avoids the combinatorial explosion by
seeking vulnerabilities in the current solution, and generating
constraints to exclude such infeasible solutions. We tested our
proposed approaches on the IEEE 30-bus and the IEEE 57-
bus systems. Computational results show the proposed online
contingency generation algorithm, which uses a bilevel sepa-
ration technique to implicitly consider all exponential number
of contingencies, significantly outperforms a standard Benders
decomposition. We were able to solve all instances in our
experiment in under three minutes, while the extensive form
and the Benders Decomposition algorithm failed to complete
at the end of 2 hours.
We believe that this paper will provide the fundamentals
for many other studies in contingency-aware transmission and
generation expansion. As an example, we want to apply for
methods to full-scale systems. While our results are very
promising in terms of scalability, full-scale problems will
surely pose some computational challenges and will require
adopting high-performance computing resources. Also our
current model assumes all failures happen simultaneously. In
order to reflect practical operation situations, where failures
may happen consecutively, new models that consider timing
between system element failures are needed. Additionally,
unit commitment and de-commitment is not considered in
our current model. We plan to extend our models for these
cases. Finally, we worked with a deterministic model, and
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it is essential, to take stochasticity into account for planning
problems. We believe our current frame work can be naturally
extended for stochastic problems.
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